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I.

INTRODUCTION

The Class Action Fairness Act of 20051 undoubtedly created more issues than it
answered.2 By federalizing essentially all interstate class-action lawsuits,3 CAFA introduced
†
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1
28 U.S.C. §1332(d) (2005).
2
For example, by way of unintended consequences, federal court antitrust filings have already begun to increase
because price-fixed products’ indirect purchasers can’t bring lawsuits under the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. §4 (2005),
for violating the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §1 (2005), yet can make claims under certain states’ antitrust or consumerfraud statutes, see Daniel R. Karon, “Your Honor, Tear Down That Illinois Brick Wall!” The National Movement
Toward Indirect Purchaser Antitrust Standing and Consumer Justice, 30 WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 1351, 1401 (2004)
(Arguing that “thirty-nine (and arguably as many as forty-four) states grant indirect purchasers standing, either on
their own or through their attorneys general as parens patriae, to pursue price fixing claims.”), and common law.

multiple legal, jurisdictional, and other theoretical challenges that the bench and bar will have to
work through together, hopefully to sensible resolutions. One of these challenges concerns
whether federal judges may rely on well-developed, state class-action jurisprudence to decide
class certification under Federal Rule 23 when considering multi-state, class-action lawsuits
alleging a single state law’s substantive application.
Federal courts rarely conducted these difficult, multi-state, substantive-law analyses preCAFA, and denying federal courts the ability to invoke years of well-developed, state-court
jurisprudence on this challenging subject post-CAFA arguably forces federal courts to decide
multi-state class certification alleging a single state law’s substantive application from a largely
blank legal slate. But even though federal courts hearing diversity-jurisdiction cases regularly

See Daniel R. Karon, Undoing the Otherwise Perfect Crime – Applying Unjust Enrichment to Consumer PriceFixing Claims, __ W. VA. L. REV. ___, ___ (2006) (Arguing that, in all states, “unjust enrichment [is] an entirely
viable, yet often underutilized, theory for pursuing consumer price-fixing claims.”). Indirect purchasers typically
filed claims in state court, where only complete diversity jurisdiction existed as defendants’ basis for removal to
federal court. But CAFA only requires minimal diversity and permits defendants to aggregate damages. See infra
Part II. Therefore, antitrust litigation that would have remained in state court pre-CAFA must now be filed in
federal court.
Also, where “two-thirds or more of the members of all proposed plaintiff classes in the aggregate, and the
primary defendants, are citizens of the State in which the action was originally filed,” 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(4)(B)
(2005), the federal court must decline jurisdiction. But to properly rebut this threshold, a defendant must prove that
the majority of the class is outside the state, which requires an empirical class analysis, such as defendant producing
its customer lists pre-class certification – not a welcome undertaking for any defendant.
Finally, “[i]f a proposed settlement in a class action provides for a recovery of coupons to a class member,
the portion of any attorney’s fee award to class counsel that is attributable to the award of the coupons shall be based
on the value to class members of the coupons that are redeemed.” 28 U.S.C. §1712(a). Accordingly, plaintiffs’
counsel have already become, naturally, less inclined to resolve class-action lawsuits for coupons and have instead
begun insisting on money damages – a result that defendants, while believing favorable during the pre-CAFA
debate, have, in some situations, begun to regret.
3
According to CAFA:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil action in which the matter in controversy
exceeds the sum or value of $5,000,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is a class action in which –
(A)
any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State different from any defendant;
(B)
any member of a class of plaintiffs is a foreign state or a citizen or subject of a foreign state and
any defendant is a citizen of a State; or
(C)
any member of a class of plaintiffs is a citizen of a State and any defendant is a foreign state or a
citizen or subject of a foreign state. 28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(2)(A)-(C) (2005).
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apply state substantive law,4 this particular state-law issue is curious in that it involves a
procedural overlay – Federal Rule 23 – that affects (or does it?) federal courts’ otherwise
traditional ability to invoke state substantive law and to conduct multi-state class-certification
analyses pursuant to it. Despite the admittedly, if not predominantly, procedural nature of a
Federal Rule 23 class-certification analysis, this Article will argue that, consistent with U.S.
Supreme Court doctrine – albeit never intended to be so invoked – federal courts may draw upon
state-law decisions when deciding multi-state class certification alleging a single state law’s
substantive application.

II.

CAFA AND ITS EFFECT ON TRADITIONAL, INTERSTATE CLASS-ACTION,
SUBJECT-MATTER JURISDICTION

CAFA fundamentally changed federal subject-matter jurisdictional doctrine as it relates
to diversity-based (i.e., interstate) class-action claims. Before CAFA, which amended 28 U.S.C.
§1332 (the federal diversity-jurisdiction statute) to create federal jurisdiction for claims
involving minimal diversity5 and amounts in controversy that, individually, total less than
$75,000,6 federal courts weren’t permitted to aggregate class members’ claims to establish the
jurisdictional minimum.
In Snyder v. Harris,7 a class-action shareholder lawsuit,8 the U.S. Supreme Court
explained that “[w]hen two or more plaintiffs, having separate and distinct demands, unite for
convenience and economy in a single suit, it is essential that the demand of each be of the

4

See Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78 (1938) (“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution
or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State.”).
5
28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(2)(A) (2005).
6
Id. at §1332(d)(2)(C).
7
394 U.S. 332 (1969).
8
Id. at 333 (Plaintiff “brought suit against members of the company’s board of directors alleging that they had sold
their shares of the company’s stock for an amount far in excess of its fair market value, [and] that this excess
represented [an illegal] payment to these particular directors. . . .”).
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requisite jurisdictional amount. . . .”9 The Snyder Court based its ruling on two considerations.
First, the Court sensed that a contrary holding would wreak havoc on the federal judiciary’s
workload.10 Second, it believed that Congress had come to rely on the Court’s interpretation in
continually re-enacting §1332’s amount-in-controversy threshold.11
Harkening back to Snyder, the Court, in Zahn v. International Paper Co.,12 later
elucidated that “class actions involving plaintiffs with separate and distinct claims were subject
to the usual rule that a federal district court can assume jurisdiction over only those plaintiffs
presenting claims exceeding the $10,00013 minimum specified in §1332[, and that a]ggregation
of claims was impermissible. . . .14 Instead, “[e]ach plaintiff in a Rule 23(b)(3) class action must
satisfy the jurisdictional amount, and any plaintiff who does not must be dismissed from the
case. . . .”15 And while the Zahn Court never expressly mentioned supplemental jurisdiction (or
its antecedents, pendent and ancillary jurisdiction), the Court’s language also effectively
precluded district courts from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction over class members with (at

9

Id. at 336 (citing Troy Bank v. G.A. Whitehead & Co., 222 U.S. 39, 40 (1911)).
Id. at 340 (“The expansion of the federal caseload could be most noticeable in class actions brought on the basis
of diversity of citizenship. . . .”).
11
Id. at 339 (“To overrule the aggregation doctrine at this late date would run counter to the congressional purpose
in steadily increasing through the years the jurisdictional amount requirement.”). See also Zahn v. Int’l Paper Co.,
414 U.S. 291, 301 (1973) (“We have no good reason to disagree with . . . the historic construction of the
jurisdictional statutes, left undisturbed by Congress over these many years.”).
12
414 U.S. 291 (1973).
13
On May 18, 1989, Congress amended §1332’s jurisdictional-minimum requirement from $10,000 to $50,000, and
on January 17 1997, amended it from $50,000 to $75,000.
14
Zahn, supra note 12, at 299.
15
Id. at 301. Interestingly, though, the Court excused unnamed plaintiffs from satisfying §1332’s “diversity of
citizenship” requirement. See Supreme Tribe of Ben-Hur v. Cauble, 225 U.S. 356, 366 (1921) (“The intervention of
the Indiana citizens in the [class-action] suit [against defendants who were Indiana citizens] would not have defeated
the [district court’s diversity] jurisdiction. . . .”). The Court never explained why it treated §1332’s diversity-ofcitizenship and amount-in-controversy requirements differently, other than to suggest that allowing unnamed
plaintiffs to evade both requirements would open the federal litigation floodgates – a result the federal courts surely
wanted to avoid but must now face. See Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332, 340 (1969) (“To allow aggregation of
claims where only one member of the entire class is of diverse citizenship could transfer into the federal courts
numerous local controversies involving exclusively questions of state law.”).
10
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least arguably) less than $75,000 in damages.16

Accordingly, district courts couldn’t

automatically consider absent class members’ claims even if the named plaintiff’s claimed
damages may have satisfied the minimum-jurisdictional requirement.17
But believing that “[c]lass-actions [were long being] manipulated for personal gain,”18
and that “[l]awyers who represent plaintiffs from multiple states [were] shop[ping] around for
the state court where they expect[ed] to win the most money,”19 on February 10, 2005, Congress
passed CAFA, and on February 18, 2005, President Bush signed CAFA into law. CAFA
amended §1332 and abrogated Zahn, thus creating original federal-court jurisdiction for class-

16

See Zahn, supra note 12, at 301 (“Any plaintiff without the jurisdictional amount must be dismissed from the
case, even though others allege jurisdictionally sufficient claims.”).
17
According to some federal courts, 28 U.S.C. §1367 (2005), which Congress enacted in 1990 and which provides
that “the district courts shall have supplemental jurisdiction over all other claims that are so related to claims in the
action within such original jurisdiction that they form part of the same case or controversy under Article III of the
United States Constitution,” id. at §1367(a), “overruled the Zahn and required district courts to aggregate the claims
of class members to calculate the amount in controversy for purposes of diversity jurisdiction. . . .” Dawalt v.
Purdue Pharmaceuticals L.P., 397 F.3d 392, 396 (6th Cir. 2005). See also State Nat’l Ins. Co. v. Yates, 391 F.3d
577, 580 (5th Cir. 2004) (“[T]he force of the argument that §1367 overrules Zahn is untouched by the presence of
multiple defendants unless we adopt the illogical (indeed, absurd) conclusion that §1367 overrules Zahn only in
single defendant cases.”); Rosmer v. Pfizer, Inc., 263 F.3d 110, 114-15 (4th Cir. 2001) (“[S]ince the pendent claims
of the absent class members raise similar questions of law and fact to [Plaintiff’s] claim, they are necessarily a ‘part
of the same case or controversy.’ . . . Therefore, the district court has supplemental jurisdiction over the other
claims [pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §1367(a)].”); Stromberg Metal Works v. Press Mechanical, Inc., 77 F.3d 928, 931 (7th
Cir. 1996) (“If §1367(a) allows suit by a pendent plaintiff who meets the jurisdictional amount but not the diversity
requirement, it also allows suit by a pendent plaintiff who satisfies the diversity requirement but not the
jurisdictional amount.”); In re Abbott Labs., 51 F.3d 524, 528 (5th Cir. 1995) (“The statute's first section vests
federal courts with the power to hear supplemental claims generally, subject to limited exceptions set forth in the
statute's second section. Class actions are not among the enumerated exceptions.”). Other courts, as described,
believed that §1367 didn’t overrule Zahn and that §1332’s requirement that all class members’ claims meet the
jurisdictional minimum remained the rule. See Trimble v. Asarco, Inc., 232 F.3d 946, 962 (8th Cir. 2000)
(“Congress in §1367(a) expressly excepted claims brought under §1332 and its well-understood definition of ‘matter
in controversy.’”); Meritcare Inc. v. St. Paul Mercury Ins. Co., 166 F.3d 214, 218 (3rd Cir. 1998) ([T]he claims of
those plaintiffs who fail to meet the amount in controversy must be remanded.”); Leonhardt v. Western Sugar Co.,
160 F.3d 631, 640 (10th Cir. 1998) (“. . . Congress in §1367(a) expressly excepted claims brought under §1332 and
its well-understood definition of ‘matter in controversy.’”). The Supreme Court, albeit after CAFA’s enactment,
ultimately confirmed that §1367 overruled Zahn and that “interpreting §1367 to foreclose supplemental jurisdiction
over plaintiffs in diversity cases who [did] not meet the minimum amount in controversy [was] inconsistent with the
text, read in light of other statutory provisions and our established jurisprudence.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah
Servs., __ U.S. __, 125 S. Ct. 2611, 2625 (2005).
18
The White House, President Signs Class-Action Fairness Act of 2005 (visited Dec. 12, 2005)
<http://www.whitehouse.gov/news/releases/2005/02/20050218-11.html>.
19
Id.
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action claims that exceed $5,000,000 in potential aggregate damages.20 Accordingly, plaintiffs
can no longer pursue multi-state, class-action cases in state courts – assuming their claims
involve any meaningful classwide damages – but must instead file their lawsuits in federal court.
In this manner, at least as contemplated by President Bush and Congress, class-action defendants
will be treated more fairly; although, not surprisingly, debate raged, and still rages, concerning
the soundness of this belief and of CAFA’s fairness.21 But regardless of this debate’s eventual

20

28 U.S.C. §1332(d)(2)(A) (2005). See also Exxon, supra note 17, at 2627-28 (“[CAFA] abrogates the rule against
aggregating claims, a rule this Court recognized in Ben-Hur and reaffirmed in Zahn.”). And while CAFA also
makes clear that, to satisfy §1332’s diversity requirement, only “minimal diversity is required,” meaning that only
one class member need be a citizen of a different state from any defendant, even pre-CAFA it was “well-settled that
a class action may satisfy §1332 if there [was] diversity only between the representative plaintiffs and the
defendants.” United States ex rel. Sero v. Preiser, 506 F.2d 1115, 1129 (2d Cir. 1974) (citing Ben Hur, 225 U.S. at
366). In this manner, CAFA’s new “minimum diversity” requirement doesn’t greatly impact the federaljurisdictional analysis since minimum diversity had effectively been the standard beforehand.
21
Fierce public debate preceded CAFA’s enactment, with numerous public officials and consumer groups voicing
strident opposition. According to House Democratic Leader, Nancy Pelosi, “[CAFA], which discourages class
action lawsuits, is far from fair. It is instead another way for Republicans to align themselves with special interests
at the expense of American consumers and the justice system.” The People Over Profits Action Network, From
House Democratic Leader Nancy Pelosi (on file with author). Speaker Pelosi added her belief that “Republicans
[were] bringing to the floor . . . a payback to big business at the expense of consumers[, and that t]he Republican
agenda is to ensure that some Americans do not get their day in court.” Id. Considering that “federal courts are
already overwhelmed by the large number of criminal drug cases and immigration case [and] do not have the
resources to handle complex issues of state law,” ATLA Press Room, Don’t Let Class Action “Reform” Deny
Justice
to
Consumers
(visited
Feb.
4,
2005)
<http://www.atla.org/ConsumerMediaResources/Tier3/press_room/FACTS/classactions/SameOldStory_2005>, in
2003 Chief Justice William Rehnquist and the Judicial Conference of the United States sent a letter to the Senate
Judiciary Committee expressing their concerns about CAFA and reiterating their opposition to many of its
jurisdictional provisions, ATLA Press Room, Federal Judicial Conference Opposed Federalizing Class Actions
(visited Feb. 4, 2005) <http://www.atla.org/homepage/fjc.aspx>, explaining that CAFA “would add substantially to
the work load of the federal courts and is inconsistent with principles of federalism.” NACA, What the Experts are
Saying About the So-Called ‘Class Action Fairness Act’” (on file with author). The Conference of Chief Justices,
which represents the interests of state supreme courts, also “came out against the class action ‘reform’ legislation,”
ATLA Press Room, Conference of Chief Justices Weighs Against Class Action “Reform” Legislation (visited Feb.
4, 2005) <http://www.atla.org/homepage/ccj.aspx>, explaining that they saw “no hard evidence of the inability of
state judicial systems to hear and decide fairly class actions brought in state courts,” and expressing their belief that
“state courts and state legislatures should be responsible for correcting any problems (with class actions), and history
has shown that will occur.” NACA, What the Experts are Saying About the So-Called ‘Class Action Fairness Act’”
(on file with author). Multiple consumer groups also went on record in opposition to CAFA’s enactment, such as
the ACLU, AFL-CIO, Coalition to Stop Gun Violence, Consumer Federation of America, Consumers Union,
NAACP Legal Defense and Educational Fund, National Association of Consumer Advocates, National Consumer
Law Center, NOW Legal Defense Fund, Public Citizen, Sierra Club, and United Steelworkers of America. See
ATLA Press Room, Public Interest Organizations Support Access to Justice – With Federal Courts Clogged, Class
Actions
Will
Die
(visited
Feb.
4,
2005)
<http://www.atla.org/ConsumerMediaResources/Tier3/pess_room/FACTS/classactions/Coalition for Justice>. Even
the Los Angeles Times commented that “[w]hen corporate executives gush over any bill with the word ‘fairness’ in

6

outcome, if any, CAFA’s enactment effectively ended the days of filing multi-state, class-action
lawsuits in state courts.

III.

THE CHOICE-OF-LAW PROBLEM CAFA CREATED

Having explained CAFA’s contours and the way it fundamentally changed federaldiversity jurisdiction, an example will help elucidate the substantive-procedural/choice-of-law
issue that CAFA inadvertently created. Let’s return to the pre-CAFA (or “de-CAFA-nated”)
world, where multi-state, class-action cases were routinely filed in state courts.22

Fully

understanding this practice requires first discussing the U.S. Supreme Court’s Phillips Petroleum
v. Shutts23 decision, which plaintiffs’ class-action counsel regularly cite for the proposition that a

its title, consumers had best check their wallets,” A Failure of Fairness, L.A. TIMES, July 3, 2005, and the New York
Times observed that CAFA “would move almost all major class-action lawsuits to overburdened federal courts from
state courts [and that s]uch a shift is likely to delay or deny justice in numerous instances, and, ultimately, to dilute
the impact of the strong consumer protection laws in many states.” Class-Action Unfairness, N.Y. TIMES, July 6,
2004.
22
See, e.g., Compaq Computer Corp. v. Lapray, 135 S.W.3d 657, 661 (Tex. 2004) (Nationwide class action
“alleg[ing] that the affected computers, some thirty-seven models of Compaq Presario computers, contain defective
FDCs, which control the transfer of data . . . between a computer’s memory and a floppy disk.”); Portwood v. Ford
Motor Co., 183 Ill. 2d 459, 461 (1998) (Nationwide class action by “thousands of people who purchased Ford
automobiles [who] sustained property damage as a result of collisions which occurred when the vehicles’
transmissions shifted from ‘park’ to ‘reverse’ without warning.”); Orman v. Charles Schwab & Co., 179 Ill. 2d 282,
284 (1997) (Nationwide class action alleging that “defendants violated Illinois agency and/or contract law when they
failed to remit to plaintiffs order flow payments received in executing plaintiffs’ securities transactions.”); Connick
v. Suzuki Motor Co., 174 Ill. 2d 482, 511 (1996) (Nationwide class action alleging “that a defect in the Samurai’s
design caused all of the vehicles to roll over during turns or evasive maneuvers.”); Washington Mut. Bank v.
Superior Court, 24 Cal. 4th 906, 911 (2001) (Nationwide class-action where defendant bank was alleged to have
“victimized its borrowers by systematically overcharging for the replacement insurance coverage and secretly
profiting through cash commissions or in-kind services from the vendors of the replacement insurance.”); Discover
Bank v. Superior Court, No. B161305, 2005 Cal. App. LEXIS 1875, at *2 (Dec. 7, 2005), rev’d as to whether
Federal Arbitration Act preempted California law concerning unconscionability of class-action waivers and
classwide arbitration, 36 Cal. 4th 148 (2005) (“[N]ationwide class action against Discover Bank . . . alleging claims
for breach of contract and violation of the Delaware Consumer Fraud Act.”); Renaissance Cruises, Inc. v. Glassman,
738 So. 2d 436, 437 (Fla. 1999) (Nationwide class action “assert[ing] that [cruise line held] out [certain] charges as
being wholly due to the ports, but then [kept] the money that [was] in excess of the actual port charges.”); State
Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Superior Court, 114 Cal. App. 4th 434, 438 (2003) (Nationwide class action by “[a]
group of policyholders [who] contend[ed] that the insurance company’s board of directors did not pay the dividends
it promised.”); Fink v. Ricoh Corp., 365 N.J. Super. 520, 531-33 (2003) (nationwide class action against camera
manufacturer for allegedly misrepresenting certain camera’s features).
23
472 U.S. 797 (1985).
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court (formerly a state court) can, under appropriate circumstances, certify a multi-state class
action under a single state’s substantive law.
Shutts involved gas royalty owners’ claims against Philips Petroleum for delaying royalty
payments.24 The royalty owners resided in all 50 states,25 but three of them, including Shutts,
filed a class-action lawsuit in Kansas, where Shutts happened to live, alleging that Phillips had
violated Kansas contract and equity law. Plaintiffs argued that Kansas substantive law governed
the entire class’ claims “notwithstanding that over 99% of the gas leases and some 97% of the
plaintiffs . . . had no apparent connection to the State of Kansas except for th[e] lawsuit.”26
Although Phillips argued that “the trial court should have looked to the laws of each State where
the leases were located to determine, on the basis of conflict of laws principles, whether interest
on the suspended royalties was recoverable, and at what rate,”27 the Kansas Supreme Court
“stated that generally the law of the forum controlled all claims unless ‘compelling reasons’
existed to apply a different law.”28 Finding no compelling reasons, the court affirmed the trial
court’s decision applying Kansas substantive law to the entire class’ claims.29
On appeal to the U.S. Supreme Court, Phillips argued that applying Kansas substantive
law had “violated the constitutional limitations on choice of law mandated by the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the Full Faith and Credit Clause. . . .”30 Drawing upon
its earlier Allstate Insurance Co. v. Hague31 decision, which also involved a choice-of-law

24

Id. at 799.
Id.
26
Id. at 814-15.
27
Id. at 802-03.
28
Id. at 803.
29
Id. at 803, 816.
30
Id. at 816.
31
449 U.S. 302 (1981).
25
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determination,32 the Court explained that “in many situations a state court may be free to apply
one of several choices of law,”33 and it ruled that doing so in a class-action setting is appropriate
so long as the law sought to be applied “is not in conflict with that of any other jurisdiction
connected to th[e] suit,”34 or, if a conflict exists, the state whose law plaintiff seeks to apply has a
“‘significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts’ to the claims asserted by each
member of the plaintiff class . . . ‘creating state interests,’ in order to ensure that the choice of
[one state’s] law is not arbitrary or unfair.”35 Considering Kansas’s “lack of ‘interest’ in claims
unrelated to [Kansas, as well as] the substantive conflict with jurisdictions such as Texas,”36 the
Court concluded that the “application of Kansas law to every claim in this case [was] sufficiently
arbitrary and unfair as to exceed constitutional limits,”37 and it refused to apply Kansas
substantive law to the multi-state class members’ claims.38
Given Shutts’ teachings, if a plaintiff (located anywhere, really), pre-CAFA, filed a multistate, class-action lawsuit against, say, an Ohio corporation in an Ohio state court for breach of

32

In Allstate, decedent, a motorcycle passenger, was killed in an automobile accident in Wisconsin. Although
decedent worked in Minnesota, he, the motorcycle operator, and the other driver lived in Wisconsin, as did
decedent’s wife. While neither the motorcycle operator nor the other driver held valid insurance, decedent held an
Allstate policy covering his three automobiles. Decedent’s policy contained an uninsured motorist clause insuring
him against loss incurred from accidents with uninsured motorists that limited coverage to $15,000 for each
automobile. Following the accident, decedent’s wife relocated to Minnesota, married a Minnesota resident, and
decedent’s estate filed suit in Minnesota seeking to stack the policy’s uninsured motorist coverage, which Minnesota
law permitted but Wisconsin law did not. Id. at 305. Affirming the Minnesota Supreme Court’s decision to apply
Minnesota’s stacking law to decedent’s estate’s claim, the Court ruled explained that “Minnesota had a significant
aggregation of contacts with the parties and the occurrence, creating state interests, such that application of its law
was neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.” Id. at 320. Accordingly, the Court believed “the choice of
Minnesota law by the Minnesota Supreme Court did not violate the Due Process Clause or the Full Faith and Credit
Clause.” Id.
33
Shutts, supra note 23, at 823.
34
Id. at 816.
35
Id. at 821 (citing Allstate, supra note 31, at 312-13).
36
Id. at 822.
37
Id.
38
Id. at 823 (“We . . . reverse [the Kansas Supreme Court’s] judgment insofar as it held that Kansas law was
applicable to all of the transactions which it sought to adjudicate.”).

9

contract, plaintiff’s theory for countering defendant’s “predominance” argument39 during the
class-certification stage and for obtaining nationwide class certification would be that, under
Shutts’ first prong, Ohio’s contract law doesn’t conflict with any other state’s contract law;
therefore, no problem exists applying Ohio law to class members located in multiple states.40 On
the other hand, if plaintiff’s lawsuit alleged that defendant had violated Ohio’s consumerprotection act,41 plaintiff’s response to defendant’s predominance argument and theory for
obtaining nationwide class certification would be that, under Shutts’ second prong, applying
Ohio substantive law – here, Ohio’s consumer-protection act – neither violates due process nor is
fundamentally unfair because defendant is headquartered in Ohio, defendant’s scheme was
hatched and implemented in Ohio, defendant profited from its fraud in Ohio, and so on.42

39

According to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(b)(3), when alleging a class-action claim for money damages,
one of the multiple requirements that a plaintiff must prove to a court’s satisfaction to obtain class certification is
that “the questions of law or fact common to the members of the class predominate over any questions affecting
only individual members. . . .” (Emphasis added.) Generally referred to as Rule 23’s “predominance requirement,”
“[t]he Rule 23(b)(3) predominance inquiry tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant
adjudication by representation.” Amchem Prods. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997). As a practical matter, “[i]n
order to meet the predominance requirement of Rule 23(b)(3), a plaintiff must establish that ‘the issues in the class
action that are subject to generalized proof, and thus applicable to the class as a whole, . . . predominate over those
issues that are subject only to individualized proof.’” In re Visa Check/Mastermoney Antitrust Litig., 280 F.3d 124,
136 (2d Cir. 2001) (citing Rutstein v. Avis Rent-A-Car Sys., Inc., 211 F.3d 1228, 1233 (11th Cir. 2000)).
Importantly, “[t]he predominance requirement calls only for predominance, not exclusivity, of common questions.”
Shelter Realty Corp. v. Allied Maintenance Corp., 75 F.R.D. 34, 37 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
40
See, e.g., Stetser v. TAP Pharmaceutical Prods. Inc., 165 N.C. App. 1, 17 (2004) (Explaining that “[t]he trial
court’s application of North Carolina law to a nationwide plaintiff class will pass constitutional muster only if the
substantive laws of each of these states does not materially differ from North Carolina’s law on plaintiffs’ claims.”);
Microsoft Corp. v. Manning, 914 S.W.2d 602, 616 (Tex. Ct. App. 1995) (Affirming multi-state class certification
under Texas law, explaining that “[n]o one will be injured in applying Texas law . . . if it is not in conflict with that
of any other jurisdiction connected to this suit.”); Delgozzo v. Kenny, 266 N.J. Super. 169, 192 (1993) (Reversing
order denying certification of a multi-state fraud and fraudulent concealment class-action claim under New Jersey
law, explaining that “[t]he additional problems with possible multi-state consumer fraud or other statutory claims
raise manageable questions. The problems inherent in certifying a class presenting conflict of laws issues are not
unsurmountable [sic]. . . .”).
41
Under some states’ consumer-protection laws, the plaintiff must be a state resident for the statute to apply. See
e.g., Avery v. State Farm Ins. Co., No. 91494, 2005 Ill. LEXIS 959, at *133 (Aug., 18 2005) (“We conclude,
therefore, that the out-of-state plaintiffs in this case have no cognizable cause of action under the Consumer Fraud
Act.”); Goshen v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 774 N.E.2d 1190, 1195 (N.Y. 2002) (“[T]o qualify as a prohibited act under
the statute, the deception of a consumer must occur in New York.”).
42
See, e.g., Renaissance Cruises, Inc. v. Glassman, 738 So. 2d 436, 439 (Fla. Ct. App. 1999) (Affirming class
certification under Florida consumer-protection law where “[t]he trial court found that Florida had significant
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Importantly (and germane to this Article), when making either argument, plaintiff would invoke
all Ohio state-court, class-action decisions applying Ohio substantive law to multi-state classes.
For defendant’s part, it would cite all Ohio state-court, class-action decisions refusing to apply
Ohio substantive law to multi-state classes.
But in today’s CAFA-nated world, plaintiff’s multi-state, class-action complaint, if filed
in Ohio state court, would be immediately removed to federal court,43 unless plaintiff originally
filed it in federal court.44 Once in federal court, at class certification, a major question would be
to what extent, if any, the federal judge could call upon or properly be influenced by Ohio state-

connections, [such as a]ppellant’s principal place of business [was] in Florida, . . . appellant’s U.S. business
operations [were] controlled and carried out from [Florida,] any overages were kept by appellant in Fort
Lauderdale[, thus] indicati[ng] the parties’ mutual expectation that Florida law would apply. . . . .”); Gordon v.
Boden, 224 Ill. App. 3d 195, 202 (1991) (Explaining that “if the trial court found that Illinois ha[d] significant
contact to the claims asserted by each class member, the court could apply Illinois substantive law to this multi-state
class action[, and that t]his finding would ensure that the application of Illinois law [was] neither arbitrary nor
unfair.”).
43
According to 28 U.S.C. §1441, “any civil action brought in a State court of which the district courts of the United
States have original jurisdiction, may be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the
United States for the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending.” Furthermore,
according to CAFA, “[t]he amendments made by this Act shall apply to any civil action commenced on or after the
date of enactment of this Act[, February 18, 2005].” 109 P.L. 109-2, §9, 119 Stat. 14 (2005). Consequently, since
CAFA’s enactment, defendants have routinely begun removing state-court, class-action cases to federal court where
original jurisdiction, pursuant to CAFA, either does or is claimed to exist. See, e.g., Natale v. Pfizer, Inc., 424 F.3d
43, 44 (1st Cir. 2005) (Affirming district court’s remand order where defendant removed plaintiff’s pre-CAFA
lawsuit, explaining that a state lawsuit “commences” when it begins in state court, not when the defendant removes
it to federal court.); Brill v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 427 F.3d 446, 447 (7th Cir. 2005) (Reversing district
court’s order denying remand to state court following removal under CAFA where plaintiff’s “suit was commenced
after February 18, 2005, the Act’s effective date.”); Bush v. Cheaptickets, Inc., 425 F.3d 683, 684 (9th Cir. 2005)
(Affirming district court’s order remanding case to state court following removal under CAFA because “[b]y its own
terms, the Act became effective for all actions that ‘commenced on or after’ February 18, 2005.”); Dinkel v. GMC,
No. 05-190-P-H, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 27237, at *7 (D. Maine Nov. 9, 2005) (Denying plaintiff’s motion for
remand since plaintiff’s lawsuit, in which he failed to serve defendants all defendants within 90 days of his preCAFA complaint’s filing, was not considered as having “commenced” pre-CAFA: “Under Kansas Rules of Civil
Procedure, however, filing the complaint alone does not necessarily ‘commence’ the lawsuit. That filing
‘commences’ the lawsuit only if process is served within 90 days thereafter. Otherwise (i.e., if more than 90 days
passes), the lawsuit does not ‘commence’ until service of process occurs. . . .”); Eufaula Drugs, Inc. v.
Scripsolutions, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 24821, at *12-13 (M.D. Ala. Oct. 6, 2005) (Remanding pre-CAFA case to
state court even though plaintiff filed its amended complaint after CAFA’s enactment, explaining that “the Amended
and Restated Complaint would relate back [and that] this case was commenced for purposes of the CAFA before the
effective date of the CAFA.”).
44
See 28 U.S.C. §1332(a) (2005) (“The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between . . .
Citizens of different States. . . .”). See also supra Part II.
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court, class-action decisions considering class certification under Ohio Rule 23 and applying (or
not) Ohio’s substantive law to multi-state classes. After all, class certification is a procedural
question under Federal Rule 23, and, as a procedural question, the U.S. Supreme Court’s Erie
R.R. Co. v. Tompkins45 decision – generally directing that federal courts in diversity cases (which
multi-state class actions are) must apply state substantive law but are directed to apply federal
procedural law46 – arguably requires the federal judge to consider only federal jurisprudence,
since class certification is a procedural, not a substantive, inquiry.
But can’t it be argued that determining what state’s substantive law applies to classwide
claims really is, in a way, a substantive question to be decided under the forum state’s
jurisprudence, thus permitting the federal judge to consider and apply state law, whether the
forum state’s or some other’s, when deciding predominance under Federal Rule 23?47 And if so,
does the fact that the federal court is considering what state’s substantive law to use necessarily
render this inquiry substantive even though the court is conducting a larger procedural analysis?
In this manner, might a court’s procedural, federal, class-action analysis be allowed a
“substantive twist,” specifically where predominance under Federal Rule 23(b)(3) (i.e., which
45

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Id. at 78 (“Except in matters governed by the Federal Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in
any case is the law of the State.”). See infra Part V.
47
See, e.g., Simer v. Rios, 661 F.2d 655, 672 (7th Cir. 1981) (“Our inquiry into the predomination analysis must[, in
part,] be on the substantive elements of plaintiffs’ cause of action and inquire into the proof necessary for the
various elements.”); Murray v. America’s Mortgage Banc, Inc., Nos. 03 C 5811, 03 C 6816, 2005 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
11751, at *9 (N.D. Ill. May 5, 2005) (“The predominance factor requires consideration of the substantive elements
of the plaintiffs’ cause of action.”); In re Tri-State Crematory Litig., 215 F.R.D. 660, 691 (N.D. Ga. 2003) (“[T]he
Court will begin its predominance analysis by setting forth the elements of the substantive law for each cause of
action.”); In re. Vitamins Antitrust Litig., 209 F.R.D. 251, 263 (D.D.C. 2002) (“[T]he predominance inquire also
requires the identification of the elements of the substantive law at issue.”); Ploog v. Homeside Lending, Inc., No.
00 C 6391, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15697, at *22 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 28, 2001) (“In determining whether the
predominance requirement has been met, the ‘Court considers the substantive elements of the Plaintiff’s cause of
action, the proof necessary for the various elements, and the manageability of the trial on these issues.’”); Ingram v.
Coca-Cola Co., 200 F.R.D. 685, 700 (N.D. Ga. 2001) (“[The p]redominance requirement focuses on the substantive
aspects of class members’ legal claims. . . .”); Panache Broad. v. Richardson Elecs., No. 90 C 6400, 1995 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 14462, at *38 (N.D. Ill. Sept. 27, 1995) (“[A] court should begin the predominance inquiry by focusing on
the substantive elements of the cause of action, and then examine the evidence necessary to prove those elements in
order to determine whether common or individual questions are likely to predominate in the litigation.”).
46
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state or states’ substantive law should apply) is concerned? And if so, does considering statecourt, class-action decisions run afoul of Erie, or is making a substantive inquiry when
conducting a larger procedural one a necessary part of a new CAFA-nated, class-action analysis
under Erie?48 Let’s find out.

IV.

THE FALLACY OF RELYING EXCLUSIVELY ON STATE
CHOICE-OF-LAW JURISPRUDENCE

When attempting to resolve this conundrum, the temptation might exist to rely
principally, if not exclusively, on state choice-of-law jurisprudence and the U.S. Supreme
Court’s Klaxon Co. v. Stentor Electric Manufacturing Co., Inc.49 decision, where the Court
considered whether, in a diversity case, “the federal courts must follow conflict of laws rules
prevailing in the states in which they sit.”50 Explaining that Erie’s scope extended “to the field
of conflict of laws,”51 the Klaxon Court ruled that “[t]he conflict of laws rules to be applied by

48

Or perhaps state-court Rule 23 decisions considering what state’s substantive law to apply are sufficiently
procedural such that they can necessarily be used according to Erie, just like state courts frequently used Federal
Rule 23 decisions when considering class certification under their state Rule 23 or equivalent procedural statute.
See, e.g., Southwestern Refining Co., Inc. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 433 (Tex. 2000) (“[Texas Rule 42] is patterned
after Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23; consequently, federal decisions and authorities interpreting current federal
class action requirements are persuasive authority.”); Echevarria, McCalla, Raymer, Barrett & Frappier v. Cole, 896
So. 2d 773, 777 (Fla. Ct. App. 2004) (“The federal cases on the issue are persuasive, because Florida [R]ule 1.220,
which governs certification of a class, is modeled on [F]ederal [R]ule 23, which is interpreted in the above federal
cases.”); In re Logan, No. 47301-8-I, 2002 Wash. App. LEXIS 475, at *11 (Mar. 11, 2002) (“Federal Rule 23 and
Washington CR 23 are the same. ‘[T]hus, federal cases interpreting the analogous federal provision are highly
persuasive.’”); CSX Transp. v. Clark, 646 N.E.2d 1003, 1007 (Ind. Ct. App. 1995) (“Federal class action cases
decided under Federal Rule 23 are persuasive authority for Indiana Courts interpreting Ind. Trial Rule 23.”); Sisters
of St. Mary v. Aaer Sprayed Insulation, No. 85CV5952, 1987 Wisc. App. LEXIS 4440, at *11 n.8 (Dec. 17, 1987);
(“[O]ur courts have relied on Federal Rule 23 and federal cases addressing it to approve of procedural
determinations made by Wisconsin trial courts in class action cases.”); Perry v. Meek, 618 P.2d 934, 940 (Okla. Ct.
App. 1985) (“Insofar as the issues under consideration arise from provisions of 12 O.S. Supp. 1979 §§13-18, which
are actually similar to the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23, the federal case law on those points is
instructive persuasive authority in this forum.”); Williams v. Motorists Ins. Corp., No. 76 CA 148, 1977 Ohio App.
LEXIS 10012, at *11 (Aug. 12, 1977) (“As to the law that would apply in the instant case, it is helpful to resort to
federal cases dealing with a similar rule, Federal Rule 23.”). This query, though, is one for another article.
49
313 U.S. 487 (1941).
50
Id. at 494.
51
Id. at 496.
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the [sitting] federal court . . . must conform to those prevailing in [the forum state’s] state
courts.”52
In the relatively infrequent occurrence where a federal court, pre-CAFA, was asked to
consider multi-state class certification – because, for instance, diversity existed and the requested
injunctive relief was considered as meeting or exceeding the jurisdictional amount in
controversy53 – federal courts, as first suggested by Allstate and later by Shutts, sometimes
invoked Klaxon to conclude that the forum state’s choice-of-law rules applied pursuant to which
these courts could blithely rule that one state’s substantive law applied to the controversy:
If a conflict of law is found to exist in this [multi-state, class-action] litigation,
this Court, sitting in diversity, is bound to apply the choice of law rules of the
forum state, New York. [Citing Klaxon] In the event that a conflict of
substantive law did exist . . . New York courts apply a “center of gravity” or
“grouping of contracts” test . . . and apply “the law of the jurisdiction having the
greatest interest in the litigation.”54

52

Id.
See, e.g., Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 860 (9th Cir. 2001) (Explaining that federal jurisdiction
exists in cases where “it is apparent that injunctive relief is the primary relief sought.”); Steinberg v. Nationwide
Mutual Ins. Co., 224 F.R.D. 67, 71 (E.D.N.Y. 2004) (“[T]he injunctive relief sought by the plaintiff furnishes the
basis for federal jurisdiction.”); Jackson v. Johnson & Johnson, Inc., 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22329, at *15 (W.D.
Tenn. Apr. 3, 2001) (Denying plaintiffs’ motion for remand because they “were seeking injunctive relief in the form
of the medical monitoring program[, and t]he amount in controversy, therefore, was measured by the value of the
object of litigation.”); Hubbard v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 95 Civ. 4362, 1996 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 6974, at *8
(S.D.N.Y. May 22, 1996) (“The Court finds that plaintiff and the alleged class members have a common and
undivided interest in the injunctive and declaratory relief sought herein. Therefore, the jurisdictional amount
requirement is satisfied if their interests collectively exceed $ 50,000.”); Gibbs v. E.I. DuPont De Nemours & Co.,
876 F. Supp. 475, 479 (W.D.N.Y. 1995) (“In a suit for injunctive or declaratory relief, the amount in controversy is
measured by the value of the object of the litigation. [Citation omitted.] The value of the medical monitoring
program sought by plaintiffs is well in excess of $50,000, even using defendants’ figures.”).
54
Steinberg, supra note 53, at 78 (suggesting that applying New York substantive law to multi-state claims when
conducting Federal Rule 23’s predominance inquiry was appropriate). See also Simon v. Philip Morris, Inc., 124 F.
Supp. 2d 46, 70 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (“The significant contacts with New York state in this [multi-state, class-action]
case satisfy Due Process and Full Faith and Credit under Shutts.”); Gruber v. Price Waterhouse, 117 F.R.D. 75, 82
(E.D. Pa. 1987) (Finding selection of forum law constitutional in securities litigation where defendant “Pennsylvania
ha[d] the most significant relationship . . . since the financial statements alleged to contain the misstatements
emanated from Pennsylvania.”); In re ORFA Sec. Litig., 654 F. Supp. 1449, 1455 (D.N.J. 1987) (“[I]t is clear that
New Jersey law applie[d] to the questions raised by Count V of the Complaint” because defendant’s principle place
of business was New Jersey and its alleged misrepresentations originated there.); In re Lilco Sec. Litig., 111 F.R.D.
663, 670 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (“After Shutts it is not at all certain that application in this case of one state’s law is
unconstitutional and in the event New York is applied, it may be that New York choice of law rules direct the
application of New York law.”); In re Activision Sec. Litig., 621 F. Supp. 415, 430-31 (N.D. Cal. 1985) (“Court . . .
53
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But conducting merely a traditional choice-of-law analysis and deciding whether or not
predominance is satisfied under the forum state’s substantive law fails to consider the larger
procedural overlay that federal courts must appreciate when analyzing what is undeniably a
procedural question under Federal Rule 23. A shorthand analytical approach under Klaxon
ignores Erie and its progeny and their generally understood directive to consider federal law with
respect to procedural matters and state law with respect to substantive ones; although, a Federal
Rule 23 predominance analysis may well be a substantive matter, just not entirely.55
Moreover, conducting solely an Allstate/Shutts analysis, and determining “that for a
State’s substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must
have a significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that
choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair,”56 also undermines, and indeed
entirely neglects, any meaningful procedural analysis. To merely contemplate the substantive
choice-of-law issues raised by Allstate and Shutts, while ignoring the procedural realities that a
Rule 23 predominance analysis necessarily engenders, likewise ignores the Supreme Court’s
long-standing Erie doctrine in favor of another analytically short-shrift choice-of-law approach
when considering multi-state, class-action litigation and a single state law’s substantive
application.

entertain[ed] a presumption that California law . . . control[ed the] case” because defendant maintained its principle
place of business there, issued securities there, and the purchasers’ acceptances were directed there.).
55
See generally note 54.
56
Allstate, supra note 31, at 312-13.
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V.

ERIE AND ITS PROGENY

Examining Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins57 and its progeny provides some better and more
complete guidance concerning federal courts’ ability to invoke state-law jurisprudence when
considering multi-state, class- action claims and applying a single state’s substantive law.

A.

The Erie Doctrine

In Erie, an object protruding from an Erie freight train injured Tompkins, a Pennsylvania
resident, while he was walking in Pennsylvania along a commonly used beaten footpath that ran
alongside the railroad tracks.58 When Tompkins brought his claim in New York federal court,
because Erie was incorporated there,59 Erie contended that under Pennsylvania law, “its duty to
Tompkins was no greater than that owed to a trespasser.”60 For Tompkins’ part, he “denied that
any such rule had been established by the decisions of the Pennsylvania courts; and contended
that, since there was no statute of the State on the subject, the railroad’s duty and liability [was]
to be determined in federal courts as a matter of general law,” which favored Tompkins.61 “The
question for decision,” explained the Court, was “whether the oft-challenged doctrine of Swift v.
Tyson shall now be disapproved.”62
In Swift v. Tyson,63 the Court had earlier held that federal courts exercising diversity
jurisdiction, in general jurisprudential matters, weren’t required to apply the states’ unwritten
laws. Rather, federal courts were free to exercise independent judgment as to what the states’
common law was or should have been:

57

304 U.S. 64 (1938).
Erie, supra note 45, at 69.
59
Id.
60
Id. at 70.
61
Id.
62
Id. at 69.
63
41 U.S. 1 (1842).
58
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[T]he true interpretation of the thirty-fourth section [of the 1789 Judiciary Act]
limited its application to state laws strictly local, that is to say, to the positive
statutes of the state, and the construction thereof adopted by the local tribunals,
and to rights and titles to things having a permanent locality, such as the rights
and titles to real estate, and other matters immovable and intraterritorial in their
nature and character. It never has been supposed by us, that the section did apply,
or was designed to apply, to questions of a more general nature, not at all
dependent upon local statutes or local usages of a fixed and permanent operation,
as, for example, to the construction of ordinary contracts or other written
instruments, and especially to questions of general commercial law, where the
state tribunals are called upon to perform the like functions as ourselves, that is,
to ascertain upon general reasoning and legal analogies, what is the true
exposition of the contract or instrument, or what is the just rule furnished by the
principles of commercial law to govern the case. And we have not now the
slightest difficulty in holding, that this section, upon its true intendment and
construction, is strictly limited to local statutes and local usages of the character
before stated, and does not extend to contracts and other instruments of a
commercial nature, the true interpretation and effect whereof are to be sought, not
in the decisions of the local tribunals, but in the general principles and doctrines
of commercial jurisprudence. Undoubtedly, the decisions of the local tribunals
upon such subjects are entitled to, and will receive, the most deliberate attention
and respect of this Court; but they cannot furnish positive rules, or conclusive
authority, by which our own judgments are to be bound up and governed.64
But the Erie Court explained that applying Swift’s doctrine had exposed serious political
and social defects; Swift’s expected benefits had never accrued; and persistent state courts’
questions concerning common law had prevented uniformity:
[T]he mischievous results of the doctrine had become apparent. Diversity of
citizenship jurisdiction was conferred in order to prevent apprehended
discrimination in state courts against those not citizens of the State. Swift v.
Tyson introduced grave discrimination by non-citizens against citizens. It made
rights enjoyed under the unwritten “general law” vary according to whether
enforcement was sought in the state or in the federal court; and the privilege of
selecting the court in which the right should be determined was conferred upon
the non-citizen. Thus, the doctrine rendered impossible equal protection of the
law. In attempting to promote uniformity of law throughout the United States,
the doctrine had prevented uniformity in the administration of the law of the
State.65

64
65

Id. at 18-19.
Id. at 74-75 (footnote omitted).
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Accordingly, the Erie Court held that, “Except in matters governed by the Federal
Constitution or by Acts of Congress, the law to be applied in any case is the law of the State. . . .
There is no federal general common law.”66 The Court added that Mr. Justice Holmes, in Black
& White Taxicab & Transfer Co. v. Brown & Yellow Taxicab & Transfer Co.,67 had articulated
the “fallacy”68 underlying Swift’s rule:
The doctrine rests upon the assumption that there is “a transcendental body of law
outside of any particular State but obligatory within it unless and until changed
by statute,” that federal courts have the power to use their judgment as to what
the rules of common law are; and that in the federal courts “the parties are
entitled to an independent judgment on matters of general law”:
“but law in the sense in which courts speak of it today does not
exist without some definite authority behind it. The common law
so far as it is enforced in a State, whether called common law or
not, is not the common law generally but the law of that State
existing by the authority of that State without regard to what it
may have been in England or anywhere else. . . .
“the authority and only authority is the State, and if that be so, the
voice adopted by the State as its own [whether it be of its
Legislature or of its Supreme Court] should utter the last word.”69
Accordingly, the Court held that, under Pennsylvania law, “the only duty owed to the
plaintiff was to refrain from wilful or wanton injury,”70 and it “reversed and the case remanded
to it for further proceedings in conformity with [its] opinion.”71 More generally, of course, the
Erie Court’s discussion and mandate have become understood to mean that “federal courts
sitting in diversity cases, when deciding questions of ‘substantive’ law, are bound by state court
decisions as well as state statutes.”72
66

Id. at 78.
276 U.S. 518 (1928).
68
Erie, supra note 45, at 79.
69
Id. (quoting Black & White Taxicab Co., supra note 67, at 532-36).
70
Id. at 80.
71
Id.
72
Hanna v. Plumer, 380 U.S. 460, 465 (1965).
67
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B.

Erie’s Transformation – Guaranty Trust Co. v. York

Supreme Court cases considering other various and assorted federal/state-law quandaries
transformed and reshaped Erie’s original mandate. Of Erie’s progeny, Guaranty Trust Co. v.
York73 offers perhaps the most valuable analytical succor, at least for this Article’s purpose. In
York, plaintiff-noteholder sued a class-action case in federal court, based on diversity of
citizenship, alleging breach of trust by defendant for defendant’s alleged failure to protect her
and other noteholders’ interests.74 The appellate court ruled that the district court was “not
required to apply the State statute of limitations that . . . govern[ed] like suits in the courts of a
State where the federal court [was] sitting even though the exclusive basis of federal jurisdiction
[was] diversity of citizenship.”75
The Supreme Court’s “concern [was] with the [appellate court’s] holding that the federal
court in a suit like [that] one [was] not bound by local law.”76 As this concern specifically
affected the state statute of limitations, the case, the Court believed, “reduce[d] itself to the
narrow question whether, when no recovery could be had in a State court because the action
[was] barred by the statute of limitations, a federal court in equity [could] take cognizance of the
suit because there [was] diversity of citizenship between the parties.”77
The Court’s analysis underscored Erie’s objective to ensure that where a federal court is
exercising diversity jurisdiction, the litigation’s outcome in federal court should be substantially
the same as if tried in state court:

73

326 U.S. 99 (1945).
Id. at 100.
75
Id. at 101.
76
Id.
77
Id. at 107.
74
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Is the outlawry [or endorsement], according to State law, of a claim created by
the States a matter of “substantive rights” to be respected by a federal court of
equity when that court’s jurisdiction is dependent on the fact that there is a Statecreated right, or is such statute of “a mere remedial character,” . . . which a
federal court may disregard?78
Withdrawing from Erie’s substantive versus procedural construct, the Court explained
that “[m]atters of ‘substance’ and matters of ‘procedure’ are much talked about in the books as
though they define[] a great divide cutting across the whole domain of law. But, of course,
‘substance’ and ‘procedure’ are the same keywords to very different problems.”79 The Court
restated the question it had considered in Erie, focusing no longer on the substantive-procedural
distinction but rather marking the emergence of its “outcome determinative test”:
And so the question is not whether a statute of limitations is deemed a matter of
“procedure” in some sense. The question is whether such a statute concerns
merely the manner and the means by which a right to recover, as recognized by
the State, is enforced, or whether such statutory limitation is a matter of substance
in the aspect that alone is relevant to our problem, namely, does it significantly
affect the result of a litigation for a federal court to disregard a law of a State
that would be controlling in an action upon the same claim by the same parties in
a State court?80
The Court considered it “immaterial whether a statute of limitations [was] characterized
either as ‘substantive’ or ‘procedural,’”81 as Erie never endeavored to formulate scientific
terminology. Rather, Erie expressed a policy touching vitally on the judicial power’s proper
distribution between state and federal courts.82 And despite lower courts’ sometimes slavish
adherence to nomenclature, Erie’s intent was to ensure the same result in state and federal courts
exercising diversity jurisdiction, not to entangle courts with analytical or terminological niceties:
78

Id. at 107-08.
Id. at 108. See also Hanna, supra note 72, at 472 (“[A] federal court system . . . carries with it congressional
power to make rules governing the practice and pleading in those courts, which in turn includes a power to regulate
matters which, though falling within the uncertain area between substance and procedure, are rationally capable of
classification as either.”).
80
York, supra note 73 at 109 (emphasis added).
81
Id.
82
Id.
79
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[T]he intent of [Erie] was to insure that, in all cases where a federal court is
exercising jurisdiction solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties,
the outcome of the litigation in the federal court should be substantially the same,
so far as legal rules determine the outcome of a litigation, as it would be if tried in
a State court. The nub of the policy that underlies Erie R. Co. v. Tompkins is that
for the same transaction the accident of a suit by a non-resident litigant in a
federal court instead of in a State court a block away should not lead to a
substantially different result.83
A federal tribunal, explained the Court, did not afford out-of-state litigants another body
of law.84 Rather, state law is the source of substantive rights enforced by a federal court
exercising diversity jurisdiction:
Here we are dealing with a right to recover derived not from the United States but
from one of the States. When, because the plaintiff happens to be a non-resident,
such a right is enforceable in a federal as well as in a State court, the forms and
mode of enforcing the right may at times, naturally enough, vary because the two
judicial systems are not identic. But since a federal court adjudicating a Statecreated right solely because of the diversity of citizenship of the parties is for that
purpose, in effect, only another court of the State, it cannot afford recovery if the
right to recover is made unavailable by the State nor can it substantially affect
the enforcement of the right as given by the State.85
In keeping with its purpose to avoid federal courts reaching different results than would
otherwise occur in state courts, the Court ruled that the state statute of limitations applied to
plaintiff’s claim, and it remanded the case for further proceedings.86

C.

York’s “Outcome-Determinative” Test Modified – Byrd v. Blue Ridge Rural
Electric Cooperative, Inc.

The Court modified its outcome-determinative test thirteen years later in Byrd v. Blue
Ridge Rural Electric Cooperative, Inc.87 The question presented in Byrd was whether “on
remand the factual issue [of whether plaintiff was an employee or independent contractor was] to
83

Id.
Id. at 112.
85
Id. at 108-09 (emphasis added).
86
Id. at 112.
87
356 U.S. 525 (1958).
84
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be decided by the judge or by the jury.”88 Under state law, the judge decided this question, while
under federal law the jury did. In deciding this issue, the Court reiterated Erie’s directive that
“the federal courts in diversity cases must respect the definition of state-created rights and
obligations by the state courts.”89 It therefore examined state law “to determine whether [the
particular judge versus jury issue was] bound up with these rights and obligations in such a way
that its application in the federal court [was] required.”90
The Court first reiterated York’s outcome-determinative test and acknowledged that it
broadened Erie:
[C]ases following Erie have evinced a broader policy to the effect that the federal
courts should conform as near as may be – in the absence of other considerations
– to state rules even of form and mode where the state rules may bear
substantially on the question whether the litigation would come out one way in
the federal court and another way in the state court if the federal court failed to
apply a particular local rule.91
But the Court then withdrew slightly from York’s test, explaining that, under certain
conditions, federal law trumped state law:
[T]here are affirmative countervailing considerations at work here. The federal
system is an independent system for administering justice to litigants who
properly invoke its jurisdiction. An essential characteristic of that system is the
manner in which, in civil common-law actions, it distributes trial functions
between judge and jury and, under the influence – if not the command – of the
Seventh Amendment, assigns the decisions of disputed questions of fact to the
jury. [Citation omitted] The policy of uniform enforcement of state-created
rights and obligations . . . cannot in every case exact compliance with a state rule
– not bound up with rights and obligations – which disrupts the federal system of
allocating functions between judge and jury. [Citation omitted] Thus the inquiry
here is whether the federal policy favoring jury decisions of disputed fact
questions should yield to the state rule in the interest of furthering the objective
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that the litigation should not come out one way in the federal court and another
way in the state court.92
The Court believed that “in the circumstances of [that] case the federal court should not
[have] follow[ed] the state rule,” because it “[could not] be [disputed] that there is a strong
federal policy against allowing state rules to disrupt the judge-jury relationship in the federal
courts.”93 As an additional basis for its decision, the Court added that, with respect to the
litigation’s potentially different outcome based on “whether the issue of immunity [was] decided
by a judge or jury,”94 it didn’t “think the likelihood of a different result [was] so strong as to
require the federal practice of jury determination of disputed factual issues to yield to the state
rule in the interest of uniformity of outcome.”95
By this wrinkle to York’s outcome-determinative test, the Court required lower federal
courts to weigh the policies behind the relevant federal and state rules to determine whether a
substantial possibility exists that different results will occur under federal law. If the state
practice reflects a weak state policy – one “not bound up” with the underlying state statute – yet
the federal practice reflects a strong policy – such as the Seventh Amendment’s jury trial
guarantee – and if no substantial possibility exists that different results will occur by using
federal law, then the federal practice is preferred. Finding this test satisfied, the Court reversed
and remanded the case for a new trial.96
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D.

A Return to York – Hanna v. Plumer

But seven years later, in Hanna v. Plumer,97 the Court swung back Erie and York’s way
when considering whether to require “service of process . . . in the manner prescribed by state
law or that set forth in Rule 4(d)(1) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.”98 Synthesizing the
preceding cases, the Court again acknowledged Erie’s rule that “federal courts sitting in diversity
cases, when deciding questions of ‘substantive’ law, are bound by state court decisions as well as
state statutes.”99 It described that York “made it clear that Erie-type problems were not to be
solved by reference to any traditional or common-sense substance-procedure distinction. . . .”100
As the Court had explained earlier in Byrd, York’s outcome-determinative test “was never
intended to serve as a talisman.”101 Instead, York’s message was that “choices between state and
federal law are to be made not by application of any automatic, ‘litmus paper’ criterion, but
rather by reference to the policies underlying the Erie rule.”102
Applying Federal Rule 4(d)(1), the Court reiterated that the natural difference between
federal and state courts ought not substantively affect a claim just because the claim is pending
in federal court. “Erie and its offspring,” explained the Court, “cast no doubt on the longrecognized power of Congress to prescribe housekeeping rules for federal courts even though
some of those rules will inevitably differ from comparable state rules.”103 Rather, federal courts’
natural “housekeeping rules” shouldn’t affect the essence of claims brought in federal court, and
federal courts should avoid inequitably administering state substantive laws merely because
diversity exists and the claims reside in federal court.
97
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VI.

FEDERAL COURTS’ FREEDOM TO CONSIDER STATE-COURT,
CLASS-ACTION JURISPRUDENCE

So how does all this concern our current issue, which is whether federal courts, when
considering multi-state class certification under Federal Rule 23 pursuant to a single state’s
substantive law, may rely on state-court, class-action decisions either supporting or denying
single-state-law application. After all, myriad state-law decisions exist upon which federal
judges can potentially draw when considering the multi-state class-certification issues that statecourt judges had previously decided for years.104
Given that Federal Rule 23 is, of course, a procedural rule, analyzing this question
exclusively under Erie encourages solely applying federal decisions when deciding class
certification. But as we know, class certification, particularly when considering a single state
law’s substantive application under Federal Rule 23’s predominance requirement, isn’t entirely a
procedural undertaking – various courts’ Klaxon analyses, which analyze and apply states’
substantive laws, confirm this.105
Rather, state laws undeniably create the claims upon which most multi-state, class-action
lawsuits are based, whether involving consumer fraud,106 deceptive trade practices,107 breach of
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contract,108 unjust enrichment,109 or some other state-law statutory or common-law claim.

In

this manner, state laws and their application can’t help but to “significantly affect the result of a
litigation,”110 since federal lawsuits based on diversity jurisdiction necessarily involve state-law
claims. Accordingly, neglecting state law, either substantive or sometimes procedural, would
preclude federal courts from fully and properly deciding multi-state, class-action claims under a
single state’s substantive law.
Erie made clear that state substantive law had a significant place in federal courts’ legal
analyses. Indeed, York confirmed that federal courts may not disregard state law as explicated in
state-court decisions. After all, if Erie’s intent was to ensure the same substantive result in
federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction as in state courts, and state law is the source from
which all substantive rights enforced by federal courts exercising diversity jurisdiction derive, no
more authoritative source for state law exists than state-court decisions, including state-court
decisions considering a single state law’s substantive application under state class-action rules.

trade practices claim “alleg[ing] that Chase ha[d] a deliberate policy of failing to post mortgage payments on the
same date they were received so that it can charge unwarranted late fees.”); J.M. Smucker Co. v. Rudge, 877 So. 2d
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*2 (Sept. 9, 2003) (Class-action, breach-of-contract claim “asserting that the value of [plaintiff’s] car was
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Moreover, considering state-court, class-action decisions advances Erie and its progeny’s
directive that a lawsuit’s outcome remains substantially the same despite the court in which the
lawsuit is pending.

And although Byrd scaled back York’s outcome-determinative test,

explaining that uniformly applying state-created rights and obligations (here, state-law, classaction decisions interpreting and applying state substantive law) needn’t apply where these state
laws are “not bound up with the [state] rights and obligations” sought to be invoked, state-court,
class-action decisions can fairly be considered as bound up with – or essential to – state classaction rules’ fundamental purposes since, in light of these rules’ purposes, state-court, classaction decisions considered, interpreted, and applied these state class-action rules from the time
these rules were enacted. Moreover, acceding to state-court decisions doesn’t risk disrupting or
otherwise offending the federal system, as occurred in Byrd since almost all state class-action
statutes mirror Federal Rule 23.111
Viewed from the opposite end, using federal class-action decisions alone isn’t so bound
up in Federal Rule 23’s predominance analysis – like, for example, the right to a jury trial is in
the Constitution112 – that state-court jurisprudence considering predominance should be
abandoned, especially considering the near, if not complete, identity between most states’ classaction rules and Federal Rule 23.113 To be sure, no “strong federal policy”114 exists against
federal courts using state-court, class-action decisions when analyzing the identical
predominance inquiry and single state law’s classwide application that had been, until recently,
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all but exclusively considered in state courts. And a predominance inquiry’s outcome may differ
based on the influence of the state-court decisions invoked versus the relatively scant federal
authority on this newly developing subject, which is yet another basis Byrd suggested for
invoking state substantive law and, accordingly, state-court decisions.
As suggested by Hanna, the fact that interstate, class-action claims are now federalized
shouldn’t substantively affect these claims’ determination. Even though state and federal courts
aren’t identical, federal courts should avoid ignoring or inequitably administering state laws
merely because CAFA now confers original federal-court, subject-matter jurisdiction on
interstate, class-action claims. Rather, federal courts’ adherence to state-court, class-certification
jurisprudence advances Erie and its progeny’s age-old pronouncements and helps ensure that
now federalized state-court claims will be decided substantially the same in federal court – their
new forum – as they had traditionally been decided in state court.
And finally, as a practical matter, absent state-law consideration, federal courts sitting in
diversity – many of which will imminently be considering this issue for the first time – will lack
significant guidance concerning application of a single state’s substantive law to multi-state
claims. To abandon years of well-developed, state-court jurisprudence forces busy and newly
challenged federal judges to analyze this issue from a largely blank federal slate, surely an
undesirable consequence115 and one that hardly comports with the judiciary’s obvious and
fundamental interest to adjudicate claims – especially class-action claims – judiciously,
efficiently, and economically.116
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VII.

CONCLUSION

Whether to apply a single state’s substantive law when considering predominance under
Federal Rule 23 necessarily traverses the substantive and procedural divide, and this query’s
unique nature evokes Erie’s fundamental essence. But examining Erie and its progeny (perhaps
even alongside Klaxon, Allstate, and Shutts) demonstrates that federal courts may, in fact,
consider state-court decisions when deciding multi-state class certification alleging a single state
law’s substantive application.

Indeed, considering state-court jurisprudence respects Erie’s

original mandate while embracing its progeny’s amplifications and nuances.
And although this issue is merely of the many still to come from CAFA’s recent
enactment, as federal, multi-state, class-action lawsuits move toward class certification, it is an
issue sure to receive significant attention. Erie and its progeny, although never contemplating
their invocation in this new world order, nonetheless demonstrate the appropriateness of
invoking state-law, class-action jurisprudence in federal class-certification proceedings
considering a single state law’s substantive application. Federal courts deciding multi-state class
certification under Federal Rule 23, therefore, are invited to sit back and drink in state-court,
class-action jurisprudence involving, analyzing, and determining single state laws’ substantive
application in today’s CAFA-nated world.

U.S. Dist. LEXIS 5589, at *7 (W.D.N.Y. Mar. 7, 1997) (acknowledging plaintiffs “logical – indeed laudable –
desire to litigate their claims as efficiently as possible”); Gabelli v. Sikes Corp., No. 90 Civ. 4904 (JMC), 1990 U.S.
Dist. LEXIS 17015, at *16 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 14, 1990) (acknowledging “the desire to avoid piecemeal litigation and
promote judicial economy”).
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